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What Is the Future of European Cyber Security? 
Three Principles of European Cooperation 
and the Hybrid Joint Strategy of Cyber Defence
Abstract
The author argues that EU member states should pursue a joint strategy 
of cyber security and cyber defence. This claim does not immediately im-
ply support for current EU legislation, in particular for enforcing the NIS 
Directive or the operation of ENISA in its currently planned capacity. In-
stead, three principles of European cooperation are discussed and followed 
by a proposal to centre the joint strategic effort around promoting and 
explicating the practical and procedural consequences of these principles. 
A bottom-up approach to joining and uniformization of European cyber 
defence is presented, aligned with the notion of Europeanization in secu-
rity policy in the sense of E. Gross and R. Ladrech. This approach requires 
that European cyber security agencies, including ENISA, focus their ef-
forts on addressing the trust defi cit among the member states through fa-
cilitating the environment for safe information exchange, instead of com-
municating with the member states through the medium of regulations 
and prescribing security standards. More generally, the author postulates 
that the European authorities embrace the inherent political character of 
international trust-building and aspire to the role of mediator, as opposed 
to presenting themselves as apolitical agents focused on the purely techni-
cal aspects of European cyber security.
Keywords: European Policy, Cyber Security, European Single Market, 
European Cooperation
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Introduction
In this paper three principles of European cooperation are isolated 
and discussed in the context of EU cyber security strategy, that is the 
principle of effectiveness, the principle of non-aggression and the 
principle of priority of the European Single Market (ESM). The fi rst 
principle originates from the fact that the European nation states are 
jointly vulnerable to trans-border cyber threats. Ahead of the predicted 
increase in the adversarial activity of the nation state actors ahead of 
the 2020 Brexit transition and considering the substantial technological 
resources available to the attackers due to the trickling down effect,1 the 
joint vulnerability of the EU members becomes all the more evident. In 
these circumstances, joining efforts in preventing the emerging threats 
is not only more effi cient when it comes to risk and resources, but may 
turn out to be strategically necessary. The principle of non-aggression lies 
at the heart of the European project and expresses the directed efforts 
to solidify within the EU borders the ‘miraculous change’ in the nature 
of political international order, no longer dominated by the threat of 
military confl ict.2 Since the emergence of new forms of warfare, Europe 
has faced the need to redefi ne what it means for the EU nation states to 
maintain peace. Based on these readjusted peace conditions, a new and 
rather problematic meaning of non-aggression presents itself. Lastly, the 
priority of the ESM is visible not only in the magnitude of constitutive 
regulations, but also in clear declarations on the side of the European 
Commission that the ESM is to be treated as ‘one of the EU’s greatest 
achievements’.3 As the external threats and country-specifi c vulnerabilities 
threaten the EU internal market integration through targeted attacks and 
the spillover effect, the priority of the ESM necessitates new measures 
in coordinating cyber security defense across the EU. The author will 
argue that these principles together shape the direction of development 
of the cyber security strategy at the EU level and help explain the current 
arrangement in the European joint cyber defense system.
First, some general characteristics of high-level (national or super-
national) cyber defense are presented, focusing on the divergence between 
the notions of a cyber threat and cyber attack. This difference translates 
1  S. Curry, How geopolitical events will change cybersecurity in 2020, “Cyberea-
son”, December 19, 2019, https://www.cybereason.com/blog/how-geopolitical-events-
will-change-cybersecurity-in-2020 (access 30.12.2019).
2  P. Hassner, An overview of the problem, in: War and Peace: European Confl ict 
Prevention, Chaillot Paper 11, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1993, p. 6.
3  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en (access 10.01.2020).
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directly into the strategies of cyber defense in that a low-risk cyber 
defense strategy must be preventative in nature, as opposed to reactive, 
especially in application to a system protecting critical infrastructure of 
national or federal scope. Next, the European joint cyber defense system 
is presented as a hybrid created as a means of mitigating the expected 
negative consequences of maintaining a joint defense strategy simpliciter 
and separating the pan-European strategy into national cyber security 
programs. These considerations yield a suggestion of what a joint defense 
program in the current diplomatic and institutional setup entails for the 
EU members. An exposition of the three working principles of European 
cooperation follows, together with a discussion about their limitations 
in the context of EU cyber security. The image of the European cyber 
defense system arising from these deliberations is one-of-a-kind.
Preventative Strategies in High-level Cyber 
Defense Systems
At the very minimum, a cyber threat is understood as ‘the possibility 
of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a computer network or 
system’.4 This modest defi nition should be amended to include the 
possibility to access fi les and infi ltrate or steal data, even in the absence of 
an attempt of damage or disruption.5 In other words, the very possibility 
to put the network of a system in jeopardy constitutes a serious cyber 
threat. The latter version of an attack may potentially put the entire 
system of institutions relying on a secure channel of communication or 
database out of operation, simply by making the communication or data 
unreliable. One yet more important aspect of the proposed defi nition is 
that it correctly identifi es a cyber threat as a possibility as opposed to an 
actual attack. An attack is merely one instance of a particular cyber threat, 
taking form of concrete actions against the security of information or the 
integrity of a network or a system.
The author will put aside the technological aspects of cyber attacks 
for the purposes of further considerations in favor of considering the 
strategies to combat cyber threats. The former are often of second-order 
importance to high-level defense policies, because there are not many 
known techniques available to deal with cyber attacks, other than through 
4  Cyberthreat, in: Lexico (Oxford Dictionary), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
defi nition/us/cyberthreat (access 25.05.2018).
5  Cyber Threat Basics, Types of Threats, Intelligence & Best Practices, “Secure-
works”, May 12, 2017, https://www.secureworks.com/blog/cyber-threat-basics (access 
25.05.2018).
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prevention. In most scenarios knowledge about the attack is only gathered 
ex post. Consequently, most types of cyber attacks cannot be stopped or 
undone. The overwhelming impact of such attacks is visible in incidents 
like the Panama Papers case from 2016, where a simple unpatched software 
vulnerability was exploited,6 or the Proton Mail Ransom case, where 
powerful distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks were conducted, 
using resources available to very few actors, such as nation states or global 
business giants.7 Once the possibility of an attack emerges and the door to 
exploitation of some vulnerability is forced open, there is close to nothing 
that a nation or a federation can do to avoid the consequences. Therefore, 
a high-level cyber security defense system aimed at maximizing security 
and minimizing risk is preventative in nature, rather than reactive. Insofar 
as the preventative measures of a high-level cyber security system belong 
in the defense agenda of the nation state or a federation, the reactive 
measures which are activated in case of an ongoing cyber attack, more 
often than not fall into the realms of crisis management and emergency 
strategies rather than align with any preexisting defense plan.
Another crucial feature of cyber security is that it contains in itself 
protection of persons and resources that benefi t from the process of collecting 
and analyzing information.8 Protecting information and communication 
is of great importance in any defense system, but ultimately information 
and communication safety is just a means of protecting other values and 
goods, as is clear in debates on, e.g., cyber terrorism. Thus, cyber security 
defense strategies protect what is instrumental to the operation and 
identity of the nation state or a federation, rather than simply protecting 
information and system security. This feature is especially prominent in 
high-level defense systems and can be called instrumentality to protecting 
core values.
Two Approaches to Cyber Defense in the EU
 The EU member states carry the primary responsibility and competence 
to build and maintain their own national security systems. However, the 
EU has taken upon a project of building the Single Cybersecurity Market, 
a uniform system of security products, services and processes, which 
6  B. Obermayer, F. Obermaier, The Panama Papers: Breaking the story of how the 
rich and powerful hide their money, Oneworld Publications 2016, p. 339.
7  S. Newman, Surviving ransom driven DDoS extortion campaigns, “Cyber Secu-
rity: A Peer-Reviewed Journal”, no. 3(1)/2019, pp. 38–39.
8  R. Von Solms, J. Van Niekerk, From information security to cyber security, “Com-
puters & Security”, no. 38/2013, pp. 97–102.
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among others shall protect the European market from a growing number 
of cyber threats.9 The aim of the pan-European cyber security measures is 
to protect the European economy, especially the ESM, and the European 
democracy via eliminating the dispersion of fake news, misinformation 
campaigns and radicalization, and other relevant threats. These two types 
of systems – the EU Single Cybersecurity Market and general national 
security systems (national cyber security plans being their part) – are 
bound to come into confl ict at many points related to cyber security, 
including issues such as the accepted certifi cation frameworks, the level 
of investment in building a system of cyber defense and the prioritization 
in defense system design. Many of those problems are technical in nature 
and could, at least in principle, be solved by intensifying EU-national 
dialogue. However, certain other issues, which will be explored in more 
detail in what follows, are based on the trade-off of principles which differ 
across the member states and which are the source of fundamental confl icts 
between the national and pan-European cyber defense authorities.
As of today, the practical decisions concerning cyber security systems 
remain in the hands of nation states. However, a number of proposal for 
pan-European coordination have been put forth and at least partially 
introduced, initially in a top-down manner and with only symbolic 
consultations with the representatives of the member states. The existing 
measures of cyber protection which are at least partly implemented at the 
EU-level include:
the EU Cybersecurity Agency (formerly operating as the European i. 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security, or ENISA), 
which provides technical support and a consultancy for implementing 
of the EU cyber security regulations,
the EU cyber security certifi cation framework, intended to replace all ii. 
national certifi cation requirements,10
the development of the EU Single Cybersecurity Market, with special iii. 
attention to assessing the encryption of products and services used by 
citizens, businesses and governments within the Digital Single Market,
the proposal to fully implement the Directive on the Security of iv. 
Network and Information Systems in order to set higher standards 
for cyber security within the nation states.
9  Cf. The joint communication to the European Parliament and the European Council 
of the European Commission’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for 
the EU”, JOIN(2017) 450 fi nal, Brussels, 13.09.2017.
10  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-cybersecurity-certifi cation-frame-
work (access 10.01.2020).
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Some of the above measures met with resistance from the nation states. 
A permanent mandate for ENISA as well as the full implementation of the 
Directive on the Security of Network and Information Systems threatened 
to overhaul their national counterparts,11 such as, in case of Germany, 
the CERT Alliance12 and the cyber security strategy already in place. The 
initial reception of pan-European security measures was poor and not 
only in Germany. This lack of enthusiasm was part of the reason why the 
reforms mentioned in the joint communication from 2017 took exceedingly 
long time to set in motion. Although theoretically rebranded and with 
extended scope of competences, ENISA still operates partly under its 
original name and struggles for legitimacy among the security providers.13 
National security agencies operate in an almost unchanged manner and 
the only observable progress seems to happen within the legislation. One 
can reasonably expect that the EU plans for joint cyber security strategy 
will result in equal or greater amount of confl icts and objections than the 
program of unifying the laws concerning data protection, where several 
nation states simply missed the deadline for adopting the data protection 
laws complying with the EU objectives (initially set to May 25, 2018). The 
period of two years was insuffi cient for some of the EU members to adopt 
the EU uniform data protection regulations, including Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia.14
Meaningful lessons about the possible future development of the EU 
joint cyber security initiatives follow from observing the contention 
between Germany and the European Commission in the recent years, 
especially visible in the declarations of the representatives of the European 
Commission (representing also the EP and ENISA) and Germany’s 
cyber security chief Arne Schönbohm. The confl ict began with the cyber 
security solutions of the NIS Directive (Cybersecurity Directive),15 which 
the European Parliament adopted on July 6, 2016 as the fi rst EU-wide 
11 https://www.euractiv.com/section/cybersecurity/news/juncker-announces-massive-
cyber-security-overhaul/ (access 10.03.2020).
12  https://www.cert-verbund.de/ (access 25.05.2018).
13  L. Brun, The role of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Secu-
rity (ENISA) in the governance strategies of European cybersecurity, Faculté des sciences 
é conomiques, sociales, politiques et de communication, Université catholique de Louvain, 
Prom.: Bellanova, Rocco 2018, p. 7; K. Sliwinski, Moving beyond the European Union’s 
weakness as a cyber-security agent, “Contemporary Security Policy”, no. 35(3)/2014, 
pp. 468–486.
14  https://euobserver.com/justice/141860 (access 10.03.2020).
15  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and informa-
tion systems across the Union, Brussels, 6.07.2016.
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legislation concerning cyber security. The transposition deadline for the 
member states (May 9, 2018) met with instant opposition from some of the 
nation states, including Germany. After a period of diplomatic hurdles, 
the EU representatives agreed to respect national sovereignty in cyber 
security regulations and measures,16 while Germany transposed a version 
of the NIS.17 The points raised during the debate of 2017-2018 period 
included the following:18
The Commission attempted to overhaul the EU member’s cyber 1. 
security rules outside the proper partnership capacity and cooperation, 
and without building necessary trust in the member states;
The Commission failed to respect the relevant priorities and values of 2. 
the member states, e.g. Germany’s objective of making cyber security 
a sine qua non condition of digitization (while the EU institutions are 
inclined to pursue digitization even without proper cyber security 
measures) or the principle of mutual recognition (allowing various 
approaches to a given threat instead of a one-fi t-all solution);
In case of Germany, the Commission tried to replace a more advanced 3. 
security strategy with a less advanced one;
The Commission does not share with member states the information 4. 
about the encryption technologies used to secure communications and 
other important aspects of its cyber security procedures, but requires 
the nation states to provide their encryption characteristics and comply 
with new standards, thus forcing centralization of decisions strategic 
to national defense;
The system of ranking the cyber security level of technology products is 5. 
underdeveloped and, like other measures proposed by the Commission, 
weakens the regulations already existing in some nation states.
What is crucial here is that the UK and Germany developed strong 
cyber security units in their intelligence, security and military service 
prior to the joint EU cyber security initiative. Such national units, unlike 
any pan-European institution, including ENISA, may indeed have the 
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cyber threats. From the purely fi nancial perspective, the EU is unable 
to develop comparable defense systems. As Schönbohm noted, the EU 
authorities can provide consultation and advice, but they have nothing 
else to bring to the table.19 However, even the member states whose cyber 
security defense systems are not as advanced as in Germany may fi nd 
themselves facing similar issues as the ones exemplifi ed in the German-
EU confl ict. In particular:
The EU members may have different priorities concerning cyber 1. 
defense, for example, some EU members are willing to take the risk 
of digitalization despite a lack of proper cyber security measures 
and procedures because the value of economic growth driven by 
digitalization outgrows the estimated risks related to cyber threats, 
while others (like Germany or the UK) cannot afford to take the risk;
The EU members may be willing to contribute signifi cantly different 2. 
resources to cyber defense;
The EU institutions may prioritize different values than the nation 3. 
states, for example, insist on protecting the right to privacy against 
government surveillance when the nation state fi nds such surveillance 
necessary or desirable;
A joint defense system means that a lot of information so far kept 4. 
confi dential by nation states will be made available to the European 
institutions, for example the characteristics of information collected, 
processed and protected by each member.
A more general underlying issue is that national security typically 
lies outside the EU competence, while IT security, mostly for the sake 
of developing Digital Single Market, is the focal point of EU digital 
cooperation. Considering these obstacles, can it still be expected that the 
EU members pursue a joint system of cyber security defense?
At fi rst glance it seems that the separation of national cyber defense 
systems should make the nation states less vulnerable. The expected 
fallout of each attack would decrease if the consequences were limited 
to a single national system or a network and if the points of access were 
minimized. Accordingly, radical proposals of ‘digital border control’ 
across Europe emerged.20 One of the weakest points in these proposals 
is that they aim to align the entire European cyber defense strategy so 
as to address cyber attacks and not cyber threats. In other words, such 
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reactive approach, instead of a preventative one (which follows, as was 
argued above, from centering the cyber security strategy around the 
consequences of attacks instead of preventing threats). Moreover, just as 
is the case with a physical security system, e.g. in military corps, uniting 
forces internationally allows nation states to raise the stakes for a potential 
adversary and intensify a potential retaliatory response. International 
cooperation allows for using human, organizational, economic, political 
and diplomatic resources which are simply unavailable to a single nation 
state.
From this point of view, the nation states with the weakest cyber 
security systems who do not have enough resources to maintain proper 
cyber defense should therefore be the most interested in joining forces 
with others. However, countries which may be put at risk via the 
spillover effect are also naturally interested in preventing threats to their 
physical or digital neighbors. Thus, from the most general perspective, 
joining the cyber security efforts across the EU primarily means that the 
member states aim to share the profi ts of well-functioning cyber security 
defense, together with sharing the fi nancial burden as well as some of the 
related risks. For each nation state a pan-European cooperation would 
bring increased technical and fi nancial capabilities, but also the need 
to comply with international agreements and mutual obligations which 
may prioritize different values than the ones of a nation state itself. What 
pursuing a joint defense strategy does not necessarily mean, however, is 
that the decisions concerning defense strategy are centralized or that the 
input of national security authorities should be reduced to executing the 
directives and decisions undertaken by the EU institutions.
Despite the fact that building a pan-European cyber defense system 
imitating national security system is not feasible, pursuing a joint defense 
strategy is still well within our reach. Rather than trying to scale up 
the already existing national defense strategies, the EU may facilitate 
a platform of exchanging and trading resources, know-how and skills 
between the national cyber security agencies. In other words, instead 
of creating a pan-European security agency – a project which is deemed 
to fail – the EU should aim to coordinate and enhance the work of 
national agencies and take the role of an advisor and mediator, instead 
of the legislator or an executive authority. The unifi cation of national 
cyber defense system should therefore be voluntary and based on mutual 
trust, rather than on the obligation to transpose contentious legislation, 
which many EU members are likely to sabotage by impairing further 
development of solutions proposed in that legislation, as was the case 
with the operation of ENISA or shared systems of security evaluation. 
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Therefore, the author will argue for a bottom-up approach to European 
cyber security uniformity, rather than a top-down approach which seems 
to be pursued currently.
One might argue that since the top-down approach does not seem to 
be a working model for EU cooperation (for one, because of insuffi cient 
funds to develop pan-European agency with suffi cient scope of competence 
without strong resistance from the member states), the European project of 
joint security strategy should be abandoned altogether. The main point of 
interest in this paper, however, is that despite its rough start and the need 
for major revisions, the project of a joint EU strategy of cyber defense is 
both needed and plausible. In what follows, three principles of European 
cooperation will be discussed, each independently motivating the joint 
cyber security efforts. The author will argue that if the three principles 
be prioritized in the EU cyber security strategy, the nation states will face 
a unique opportunity for trust-building and development. The strategy 
based on the prioritization of these principles is referred to as hybrid, as 
despite the clear joining of efforts it allows that the nation states protect 
crucial elements of their defense sovereignty.
Three Principles of European Cooperation
The Principle of Effectiveness
The fact that the EU members are jointly vulnerable to various cyber 
threats is vividly exemplifi ed in the trans-border attacks which took place 
in the recent years, like the Wannacry attack21 and the NotPetya attack 
from 2017,22 the election campaign hacks in 2016 and 2017 where attacks 
were used to delegitimize the electoral process or cast a shadow over 
elected representatives.23
The expected future cyber threats concern the governmental (or 
otherwise public) information systems or networks, as well as the 
information systems of private agents operating on the territory of 
a given nation state. Both types of threats carry over to the national or 
European cyber defense systems. Accordingly, the German cyber security 
21  Cf. S. Ghafur, S. Kristensen, K. Honeyford, G. Martin, A. Darzi, P. Aylin, A ret-
rospective impact analysis of the WannaCry cyberattack on the NHS, “NPJ digital medi-
cine”, no. 2(1)/2019, pp. 1–7.
22  E. Nakashima, Russian military was behind NotPetya cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA 
concludes, “The Washington Post”, no. 12/2018; A. Greenberg, The untold story of Not-
Petya, the most devastating cyberattack in history, “Wired”, August 22, 2018.
23  M. Baezner, P. Robin, Cyber-confl ict between the United States of America and 
Russia (No. 2), ETH Zurich 2017, p. 15.
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cooperation group (the aforementioned CERT Alliance) is composed of 
over 40 private and public institutions which form a partnership based on 
voluntary participation and recognition of joint vulnerability rather than 
a hierarchical structure with governmental executive unit at the top.
Many of the companies involved in CERT Alliance are trans-national 
and operate on territories of other EU countries. The current situation 
where Germany attempts to protect the information systems of companies 
which operate also in other EU countries is suboptimal on multiple 
levels. First, in order to protect its information infrastructure and private 
market economy, Germany has to invest its resources in solutions which 
necessarily benefi t all those countries which are under the operation of 
private companies included in German protection strategy. This creates 
imbalance, because some European countries become direct benefi ciaries 
of the German cyber security system without contributing to it, effectively 
freeloading on the German approach to the safety of infrastructure. 
Conversely, in future, Germany may try to make up for its input into the 
economies of other EU members and demand diversifi cation of business 
relationship of the companies and particular EU members. For example, 
in exchange for the protection against cyber threats, the companies may 
be required to offer better prices, products and services to consumers and 
institutions in Germany than in other EU countries. This direction of 
travel not only creates higher overall costs, but also weakens the ESM.
For certain countries which do not value its cyber defense as high as 
Germany, it might seem advantageous that the contributions to the cyber 
defense remain separate across the EU, as the counties heavily invested 
in information security will, as a side effect to their own agendas, protect 
parts of the digital economy of others. However, the investment in cyber 
security will sooner or later take visible effect on prices and service 
conditions offered to the freeloader. From the long-term perspective, such 
situations should be avoided for: fi rst, the sake of fairness, second, due to 
the risk they pose to the freeloaders’ participation in the ESM.
Despite the possibility to ease the imbalance of contributions, 
Germany is still promoting the idea of individual (national) protection 
against cyber threats. This is partly due to the fact that the current cyber 
security strategy in the EU impair the building of methods of balancing 
the contributions, either through legislation or voluntarily. Note that 
even Germany is not opposing the idea of trans-national cooperation 
in cyber defense, even at the pan-European level. Rather, it is opposing 
the approach which the European Commission takes as a default in 
promoting new cooperation methods. This approach includes passing 
on binding legislation which greatly exceeds technical issues and aims to 
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introduce uniformity among the member states by averaging the security 
requirements, instead of leveling up the quality of protection. Ultimately, 
adopting the default EU standards would mean that Germany is forced 
to keep up its fi nancial responsibilities while having less control over its 
own security standards. Moreover, the common resistance towards ENISA 
often stems not from the lack of support to uniformity in the EU cyber 
security defense systems, but rather from justifi ed fear of centralizing 
cyber security units in a way which is not in agreement with the EU 
members and without considering the alternative methods of pursuing 
a joint defense system. This fear could be partially done away with if 
the EU pursued its role as the facilitator (as opposed to the regulator) 
of the joint European cyber security efforts. The effectiveness principle 
suggests that, even in a situation when the nation states are reluctant 
to delegate decisions to the EU, they should be willing to take a seat at 
a negotiation table to lower their long-term costs (either direct, as in 
case of Germany, or indirect in case of those who will repay their lack of 
contribution in raised market prices for goods and services). 
The Principle of Non-aggression
The non-aggression between the member states means lessening the 
possibility of war between the member states, understood both as a cyber 
war (mutual or one-sided attacks on information infrastructure) and as 
a regular war in which information security and safety of communication 
play a central role. Cyber threats constitute a vast catalog of potential hostile 
actions, including criminal, terrorist and hostile state-sponsored activity. 
A specifi c cyber threat may involve multiple such actions, which is why 
attributability problem occurs at two levels. First, it is nearly impossible 
to discover the identity of the attacker. Then again, without knowing the 
attacker’s identity attributing motivation behind the attack is problematic. 
Cases of successful attributions are rare and mostly due to accidental leak 
or whistleblowing.24 A typical cyber threat with far-reaching political 
and military consequences is the interception of communications. For 
instance, Welchman argued that breaking the enigma machine code by 
Bletchley Park cryptographers shortened the WWII by two whole years, 
and that Hitler’s strategy of Blitzkrieg relied on safe communications in 
the battlefi eld.25 Availability of safe communication is easily weaponized 
24  Global intelligence oversight: governing security in the twenty-fi rst century, eds. 
Z. Goldman, S. Rascoff, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, p. 243.
25  G. Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes, M&M Baldwin, 
1997, chapter 1.
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and so it should be equally available to all the member states. This implies 
sharing critical protection standards and technologies across the EU.
Coming back to the identity attribution problem, the attackers may 
abuse third party resources to perform an attack, thus obscuring the source 
and leveraging third party ignorance against the system or network of 
interest. Oddly enough, unless the EU members commit their resources 
to building a joint defense strategy and facilitate the practice of sharing 
the information relevant to fending off the threats, it may become 
possible for one member state to be at war with another inadvertently via 
unwitting contribution of resources. One of the strongest motivations for 
the European project as a whole has been to avoid the war between the 
member states and preventing third party adversaries from leveraging the 
resources of one European country against the other.26 Productive channels 
of sharing information and collective diagnosis of threats promise to extent 
this principle of pan-European non-aggression onto the fi eld of security 
which emerged only after the conception of the European federation.
Understandably, sharing critical information often causes decision 
crises within national intelligence agencies. Building a joint cyber defense 
system cannot entail sharing all information with an unspecifi ed and 
uncontrolled forum of European security personnel and members of all 
other national agencies. Therefore, addressing the trust defi cit among the 
EU member states should have priority over all other goals of the joint 
European cyber security strategy. The already established coordination 
protocols for national security may be a good starting point. Namely, 
despite the fact that national military security remains outside the scope 
of the EU institutions and the decision outlets remain fully decentralized, 
European military strategies are not at all independent from each other. For 
one, the EU maintains the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
to plan and respond to international crises.27 If the joint cyber security 
system were to follow similar protocols, lack of a central cyber security 
agency would not be much of a problem, since separation of competence 
into nation states does not necessarily entail that the cyber security system 
cannot be coordinated and made uniform throughout the EU countries.
Then fi nally, the EU intelligence agencies do cooperate with each 
other on regular basis. What makes it hard to facilitate such cooperation 
in the context of pan-European relations is the perception of shifting 
26  J. Wouters, F. Naert, The European Union and Confl ict Prevention: a Brief Historic 
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the decisions concerning information exchange towards the top of the 
institutional hierarchy. If the EU were to facilitate the environment for 
safe information exchange instead of simply incentivizing the member 
states to reveal their intelligence materials, the project of joint cyber 
security strategy may bring one-of-a-kind value to European cooperation. 
By allowing the agencies to work together and helping build mutual trust 
between the EU members, the European institutions would contribute 
to both intensifi cation of cyber security measures in the EU and further 
integration of the member states. In the current state of development 
of the EU cyber security strategy the trend is slowly shifting away from 
centralizing security units and enforcing regulations. However, this shift 
must be accelerated, and the European Cybersecurity Agenda modifi ed so 
as to clearly serve the best interest of the member states.
The Principle of ESM Priority
The principle of ESM priority is perhaps the most self-evident of 
the three, as the large-scale business entities like Apple or Facebook 
tend to negotiate their policies and decisions almost exclusively with 
the European representatives, while rarely attempting to deal with the 
institutions of the member states. For instance, the European courts and 
EU data protection units have at their disposal powerful tools for changing 
the privacy policies, user agreements, invalidating patents and solutions 
which threaten to harm the EU consumers and political systems. The 
national data protection authorities and other national security are often 
not competent to address such large-scale negotiations and crises. This 
opens up the possibility of good reception of the European assistance with 
cyber security problems which relate to the private market and which 
overwhelm the national cyber defense systems. The aforementioned 
impact of contribution imbalance on the equal access to the ESM is 
another argument for pursuing a joint hybrid cyber security strategy. 
Conclusions
The push towards uniformity in the policies and standards 
concerning cyber security across the EU is consistent with the trend of 
Europeanization of wider security policy. Following Ladrech, Gross28 
28  E. Gross, Germany and European security and defence cooperation: The Europe-
anization of national crisis management policies?, “Security Dialogue”, no. 38(4)/2007, 
p. 504; R. Ladrech, Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case of 
France, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, no. 32(1)/1994, p. 69.
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defi nes Europeanization of security policy in terms of the infl uence of 
European cooperation on nation states as ‘incremental process reorienting 
the direction and shape of policies to the degree that European cooperation 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic 
of national politics and policy making’. This defi nition is consistent 
with the nation state sovereignty as far as the process of reorienting the 
domestic policies may be initiated by domestic decisions. Thus understood 
Europeanization invites a bottom-up counter-process, which consists in 
‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive 
structures of governance’.29
In the recent years the EU has taken steps towards facilitating the 
bottom-up integration of cyber security policies, most notably through 
building the foundations of the future contractual partnership between 
the private and public sector.30 This step closely resembles the German 
initiative of private-public partnership in the CERT Alliance and opens 
a possibility of trust-building activity within the private and public sectors 
of the member states. With further consideration of the three principles 
of cooperation and their extension onto the cyber security strategies 
across the EU, the member states may join their cyber security efforts 
to the level which is under their control, and therefore, preserving their 
state sovereignty in decision-making, and to the long-term advantage of 
each member, where the payoff is bound to manifest itself either through 
enhanced protection of critical infrastructure or through improved 
conditions of participation in the ESM.
The author argued that the EU member states should pursue a joint 
strategy of cyber security and cyber defense. This claim does not 
immediately imply support for the current EU legislation, in particular 
for enforcing the NIS Directive or the operation of ENISA in its currently 
planned capacity. Three principles of European cooperation were discussed 
and followed by a proposal to center the joint strategic effort around 
promoting and explicating the practical and procedural consequences of 
these principles.
The fi rst principle, called the principle of effi ciency in European 
cooperation, states that sharing the costs of building a resilient cyber 
security system is benefi cial, assuming that a perceivably fair distribution 
of commitments is agreed upon. The principle of non-aggression between 
29  T. Risse, M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso, Europeanization and Domestic Change: 
Introduction, in: Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, eds. 
M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso, T. Risse, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2001, p. 3.
30  C. Banasiński, Cyberbezpieczeństwo. Zarys wykładu (Cybersecurity. Draft of the 
lecture), Warszawa 2018, pp. 55–56.
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the member states, which is fundamental to the European project as 
a whole, requires extending onto the new realms of warfare, including 
cyber warfare. Finally, the principle of priority of the ESM states that 
equal participation in the ESM be seen as an objective by the member 
states without being taken for granted. The consequence of this change is 
that the member states negotiate their respective contributions to cyber 
security systems and tools instead of relying on the EU regulations which 
guarantee a certain level of ESM access.
All in all, a bottom-up approach to joining and uniformization of 
European cyber defense is argued for. This approach requires that the 
European cyber security agencies, including ENISA, focus their efforts of 
addressing the trust defi cit among the member states through facilitating 
the environment for safe information exchange, instead of communicating 
with the member states through the medium of regulations and 
prescribing security standards. More generally, the author postulates 
that the European authorities embrace the inherent political character of 
international trust-building and aspire to the role of mediator, as opposed 
to presenting themselves as apolitical agents focused on purely technical 
aspects of European cyber security.
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